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Introduction
How do sudden, large wealth losses affect mental health? Despite a large literature on the relationship between socioeconomic status and health, the answer to this question is not well-known. Most prior studies that use exogenous shocks to identify the causal effects of income on health exploit natural experiments that increase income (see, e.g., Frijters et al., 2005; Gardner and Oswald, 2007; and Kim and Ruhm, 2012) or lead to wealth accumulations (e.g., Smith, 2004) . These studies show that some types of income increases lead to mental health improvements, while receiving a bequest or experiencing gains in stock market wealth have no significant effects on health. The health effects of losing money are studied less often despite the fact that a number of life events such as divorce, widowhood, and expensive medical episodes can trigger significant declines in material well-being.
Research on the effects of wealth losses is especially important if the effect of wealth on health is asymmetric. Results from economics and psychology experiments provide ample evidence that individuals respond differently to losses than they do gains. For example, subjects in experiments often place a higher value on a good that they own compared to an identical good that they do not own (the endowment effect). One explanation for this effect is loss aversion, which explains that the disutility of losing a good is greater than the utility of obtaining it (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) . Furthermore, the effects of large wealth losses may be far more disruptive than generalizations of the effects of small gains or losses may suggest. It may take years of favorable stock market returns to recapture wealth losses, whereas small losses can be offset by an increase in work hours or a short-term change in consumption patterns. If the psychological or economic consequences of losses differ in these ways, then prior studies that focus on the effects of sudden gains in socioeconomic status may offer little guidance on the effects of losses on health.
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In this study, we identify the effect of large wealth losses on mental health by focusing on the immediate and largely unexpected declines in the net worth of U.S. households brought on by the stock market crash that occurred in the fall of 2008. In the 8-day trading period that began on October 1, 2008, the closing value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell by nearly 2,400 points or roughly 22%. After a small uptick, the DJIA fell throughout the month; by the end of October, the index had reached its lowest level since 2003. By December 2008, retirement accounts had lost almost one-third of their value on average, and total losses were estimated at $2.8 trillion (Soto, 2008) crash. We allow the effects of the crash to vary by respondent's exposure, which we measure in pre-crash wealth in stocks and individual retirement accounts.
We find that respondents interviewed post-crash lost significantly more non-housing wealth between the two survey waves than respondents interviewed before the crash. Results from several falsification and placebo tests suggest that our post-crash indicator identifies the effects of the stock market crash separately from the effects of changes in the housing market or the unobservable traits of respondents interviewed later in the year. We find that respondents interviewed post-crash were also significantly more likely to feel depressed than those interviewed prior to October 2008. Further, the adverse effects on depression and anti-depressant use were largest among those with the largest wealth losses.
Results from instrumental variables analysis suggest that large wealth losses have a causal effect on the likelihood of depression. For example, a loss of $50,000 of non-housing wealth increases the likelihood of feeling depressed by 1.35 3 percentage points, or by 8% relative to a mean rate of 16.6%. Our results provide evidence that large wealth losses have immediate effects on mental health and may serve as useful evidence when evaluating the effects of other events that reduce wealth, such as divorce, widowhood, or costly medical expenditures associated with a family member's illness.
Previous Literature
A key distinction between our work and prior studies in this literature is that we examine an exogenous event that reduced wealth while the identification strategies of most prior studies are based on income or wealth increases. These increases may result from either new public programs (Case, 2004; Frijters et al., 2005; Chung and Kim, 2011; Robert, 2011) , lottery winnings (Lindahl, 2005; Gardner and Oswald, 2007; Apouey and Clark, 2010) , or inheritances (Meer et al., 2003; Kim and Ruhm, 2012) . Most of these studies find that income from new public programs improves health status or health or life satisfaction, or that winning the lottery improves mental health. In contrast, receiving a bequest appears to have no effect on various measures of health status, including selfreported health, ADL and IADL limitations, and depression (Meer et al., 2003; Kim and Ruhm, 2012) , and wealth increases driven by stock market gains are not associated with improvements in physical health.
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Two studies that examine the effects of decreases in income are Snyder and Evans (2006) and Sullivan and van Wachter (2009) . Snyder and Evans (2006) look at the effects of a legislative change affecting U.S. Social Security payments, and find that those receiving lower incomes as a result had significantly lower mortality rates. Since reductions in Social Security benefits may have increased 1 There is some evidence that increases in income can worsen health behaviors. Kim and Ruhm (2012) report that receiving a bequest increased recreational drinking; similarly, Apouey and Clark (2010) report worsening health behaviors among lottery winners, like increased drinking and smoking. 4 employment incentives, these results could be explained by the social benefits of remaining in the labor force. Sullivan and van Wachter (2009) find that job displacement led to large increases in short-term mortality risk as well as smaller increases in long-term mortality risk. Their results are suggestive of the effects of income losses on health since short-term earnings losses were greater than longterm earnings losses, and since workers with larger earnings reductions experienced larger increases in mortality.
Our work differs from the prior studies of earnings decreases in several ways. First, we examine the immediate effects of wealth losses on mental health, as opposed to long-term or even one-year effects on mortality. This is because our research strategy compares HRS respondents affected by the 2008 stock market crash to those who were not affected based on the timing of the 2008 interviews; over a longer horizon, for example, by the 2010 interview, every individual in the HRS has been affected by the 2008 crash. Nonetheless, our focus on mental wellbeing, rather than mortality, is very appropriate for testing short-term effects.
Mental well-being is likely impacted by material losses more immediately than mortality. Psychological research suggests that reductions in wealth increase stress levels, and higher levels of stress are associated with increases in depression and other mental illnesses (see, e.g., Rabkin and Struening, 1976; Schneiderman, Ironson, and Siegel, 2005) . It may take as little as two weeks for depressive symptoms to emerge, and major life events such as assault, job loss, and financial or housing problems can have significant causal effects on psychological well-being even when measured within one month of the stressful life event (Dohrenwend, 1973; Kendler et al., 1999) .
2 Because we focus on the immediate impacts on mental health, there is also less ambiguity about the 2 Stress may subsequently worsen physical health as elevated stress hormones take their toll on the cardiovascular and immune systems, but these effects may not be immediate (see, e.g., McEwen 1998; Schneiderman, Ironson, and Siegel, 2005) . channels or mechanisms linking wealth to health compared to studies that focus on long-run risk of mortality (e.g., Snyder and Evans, 2006) . Of course a downside to our approach is that there may be important differences in the shortrun and long-run relationships between wealth and health. For example, looking at income increases, Moore (2011) and find that having more income causes consumption and activity levels to increase, and thereby leads to increases mortality in the short-term. As a result, our study is unable to examine whether the effects we observe are transient or permanent.
We also examine wealth fluctuations with the potential to affect a larger population of individuals compared to events like winning the lottery or receiving an inheritance. The 2008 stock market crash was unanticipated and affected asset levels for all stockholders. Because the effects of the crash were both large and sudden, our strategy differs from Smith (2004) who used stock market changes in the 1990s in an attempt to identify health effects. Smith found little evidence that exogenous wealth increases were timed with health improvement. As noted above, it is possible that the effects of wealth losses differ from those of wealth gains; if this is the case, our study of the events of the 2008 stock market crash may be especially informative. 
Methodological Approach
Identification Strategy
Our study employs data from several waves of the HRS, a nationally representative longitudinal survey of more than 22,000 Americans over the age of We then allow the crash to have heterogeneous effects on wealth; in particular we examine whether respondents who had more "exposure" to the crash suffered greater wealth losses. We first estimate Equation (2) below:
Here, STOCK equals one if the respondent held any non-zero amount of wealth in stocks or IRAs, and zero otherwise; NOSTOCK equals one if the respondent held no wealth in stocks or IRAs, and zero otherwise. These variables measure exposure to the effects of the stock market crash; we anticipate that the crash will impact respondents who own stocks and IRAs and have less effect on those with no stock or IRA wealth. 6 We define the respondent's exposure using stock and IRA wealth in 2006 (prior to the crash); this addresses the concern that mental health issues affect the decision to invest in risky assets (Bogan and Fertig, 2012) .
Estimates of α 1 that are negative and larger (i.e., more negative) than the estimates of α 2 would support our identification strategy. 5 In contrast, Lindahl (2005) examines the health effects of percent increases in income; we compare our estimated effect sizes to his below. While a large literature also explores the health effects of relative income (income compared to one's peers, for example), we do not pursue that approach because of the challenge of identifying the appropriate reference groups.
6 This exposure measure does not capture all of the ways a respondent's wealth could be affected by stock market events. Some respondents who have employer pensions or own mutual funds may also be exposed to the crash, and some of these respondents could have no direct holdings of stock or IRAs. However, the HRS data do not permit us to measure whether the respondent's pension or mutual fund consists of stocks or the percentage of the respondent's IRAs holdings that are held in stock, at least in our sample (Gustman et al. (2011) do so for a much smaller sample of HRS respondents). Exposure to the crash might also depend on the attributes of the respondent's pension plan, such as whether the plan is a defined contribution plan and how much of the respondent' portfolio is held in stocks.
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As a second test for heterogeneous effects, we estimate Equation (3) below:
In this specification, we allow the effects of the crash to vary across three groups of respondents: those with no wealth in stocks and IRAs (NOSTOCK), those with some wealth in stocks and IRAs (LOWSTOCK), and those with more wealth in stocks and IRAs (HISTOCK). Specifically, HISTOCK equals one if the respondent had stock and IRA wealth levels at or above the median wealth of stockholders (in terms of wealth in stocks and IRAs, not their overall wealth), and zero otherwise; LOWSTOCK equals one if the respondent had stock and IRA wealth levels that placed them in the less wealthy half of stockholders (again, in terms of the amount of wealth in stocks and IRAs), and zero otherwise. 7 Again we expect that exposure increases with the amount of wealth held in stocks/IRA; this specification allows the effects of increased exposure to be non-linear. As in equation (2), respondent exposure is based on 2006 wealth holdings. In this case, support for our identification strategy would come from negative estimates of  1 that are larger (i.e., more negative) than estimates of  2 and  3 .
To examine the effect of the crash-induced wealth losses on health, we use two approaches. In one approach, we estimate a series of models similar to those described above, in which the dependent variable is one of several measures of mental and physical health, and in which the key explanatory variable is an indicator representing a "post-crash" interview. Our preferred specification is represented by Equation (4) below:
where H is one of several health measures. This reduced form specification allows the effects of the crash to vary by the respondent's exposure to the crash and to look for evidence that those respondents who experienced the largest wealth reductions as a result of the crash also experienced the largest health consequences from the crash. Our second approach provides direct evidence of the causal relationship between changes in wealth and changes in health from a set of instrumental variables models illustrated by equations (5) and (6) below: 
Data
We estimate our regression models using two samples of HRS respondents constructed as follows. Of the combined respondents to the 2006 and 2008 waves (35,686 respondents), we define our sample as those respondents with non-proxy interviews in both waves (n=30,508), designated as the financial respondent in the household in both waves (n=20,708), 8 and born no later than 1953 (n=20,040).
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The resulting sample includes 10,020 unique financial respondents and is our first 8 There is one financial respondent for almost every household interviewed in the HRS. In onerespondent households, the sole respondent is the financial respondent; in two-respondent households, the financial respondent answered household-level financial questions on behalf of the entire household. This respondent was determined based on the answer to the question: "Which member of your immediate family is most knowledgeable about your family's assets, debts and retirement planning?" 11 estimation sample. We also define a second estimation sample that excludes respondents in the top 1% and the bottom 1% of 2006 non-housing wealth, leaving us with 19,642 respondents in both years, or 9,821 unique respondents. Table 1 Non-housing wealth is our preferred wealth measure because it includes IRA accounts which are likely to be impacted by the crash; we also prefer this broadly-defined measure in our instrumental variables analysis of the wealth effects on health. As a robustness check, we also examine financial wealth, defined in the RAND HRS data as total financial assets less debt, including 12 checking and savings accounts, CDs, savings bonds and Treasury bills, bonds, stocks, mutual funds, plus other savings and assets, but excluding IRA accounts.
This exclusion makes financial wealth less suitable for our study, given that IRA account owners face considerable exposure to the market. Gustman et al. (2011) report that, among the early boomer HRS cohort, 73% of IRA assets were held in stocks (see Table 1 of their study).
We use six measures of HRS respondents' health. The first is the Center 11 The other four items deal with whether "everything is an effort", whether "sleep is restless", and whether the respondent "enjoys life" and "cannot get going." The score is the sum of the number of negative symptoms reported, plus (1 minus "enjoys life") and (1 minus "feels happy").
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interview took place post-crash, there was a somewhat smaller decline, from 18.2% to 16.6%. The proportion of respondents in fair or poor health increased across both waves, and the increase was somewhat larger among those interviewed post-crash relative to the full sample. health conditions across waves, 14 the time between waves (measured in months and months squared), and two indicator variables to control for changes in the season in which the interview takes place. 15 As noted above, the first-difference specification controls for time-invariant traits that may be correlated with the post-crash indicator and our outcomes of interest, whether these traits are observed (such as race, sex, education) or unobserved (such as risk preference). Table 2 presents our main analysis of the effects of the crash on respondent wealth, where wealth is measured as total non-housing wealth.
Empirical Results
Effects of the Stock Market Crash on Wealth
Columns (1) and (2) report the estimated post-crash coefficient from Equation (1) using the sample of all financial respondents and then excluding the top and 14 The physical health conditions are cancer, diabetes, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, arthritis, and hypertension. We include separate indicators for each condition. To preserve sample sizes we also include a set of controls for whether the respondent is missing data on a given indicator, and then recode the indicator to zero. 15 The designation known as SAD, or seasonal affective disorder, links the onset of depressive symptoms to decreases in daylight timed with fall and winter months. For example, Tefft (2012) shows that more hours of darkness are associated with adverse mental health and employment outcomes. These controls help to account for the possibility that respondents in our sample were interviewed at different times of the year in the 2006 and 2008 waves and that the onset of seasonal depression might be correlated with being interviewed post-crash in 2008. It is not clear how much of a concern this should be, as the post-crash period includes both spring and winter months (October 2008 through April 2009). Nonetheless we include a dummy equal to one if the respondent's interview changed from a fall/winter month to a spring/summer month between 2006 and 2008 (and zero otherwise), and a second dummy equal to one if the respondent's interview changed from a spring/summer month to a fall/winter month across the two waves (and zero otherwise). Certain HRS design features (namely an oversample of both Floridians and Hispanics) also help to mitigate concerns of SAD for respondents who live in regions with perpetually summery weather. We obtained similar results when we used a set of month of interview dummy variables in place of the seasonal change in indicators. 16 It is possible that some of the control variables are themselves affected by the crash (e.g., income). As a robustness check, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of household income and other controls. These results are described below.
15 bottom 1% of the wealth distribution. In the full sample, the crash had a statistically significant effect on non-housing wealth, reducing it by more than $238,000. When we trim the sample to exclude the top and bottom 1% of respondents from the sample, the estimated crash effect is wealth loss of just under $44,000 but the effect is no longer statistically significant. The sizes of these effects are consistent with the asset declines in reported by Bricker et al. (2012) .
The remaining columns of and those with no stock/IRA wealth (the remaining 52.8%), as in Equation (2). In columns (3) and (4) we report the post-crash coefficients from this equation for both the full sample and the trimmed sample. In both samples, the post-crash coefficient defined for stockholders (POST*STOCK) is negative and significant, and much larger in absolute value than the post-crash coefficient defined for nonstockholders. The estimated post-crash coefficient for non-holders is also statistically insignificant. The results for the trimmed sample, for example, suggest that the crash caused wealth declines of more than $81,000 among respondents with any stock/IRA wealth, but led to no significant changes in wealth for respondents without stocks or IRAs.
We then allow the effects of the crash to vary across respondents in the top half of the stock/IRA wealth distribution in 2006 (23.6% of respondents), those in the bottom half of the stock/IRA wealth distribution (another 23.6%), and those with no stock/IRA wealth (the remaining 52.8%). In columns (5) and (6) we report the post-crash coefficients from this equation for both the full sample and the trimmed sample. In both samples, the results show that the intensity of the crash effect varies by exposure. Effects are largest for those in the top half of the stock/IRA wealth distribution (e.g., in the trimmed sample, the crash caused wealth losses of $223,581), and statistically insignificant for the other types of respondents. Results from χ 2 tests in both samples allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the post-crash coefficients are equal among the top half of stockholders and the non-stockholders (p<0.001). As a robustness check, we estimate the same set of models using financial wealth as a dependent variable;
recall that this more narrowly focused measure includes stocks and mutual funds but excludes IRA accounts. As expected the coefficients of the post-crash indicator variable and interaction terms are smaller, but the pattern is the same as that seen for non-housing wealth (see Appendix Table 1 ). Clearly, the events on Wall Street had very different effects on wealth depending on a given respondent's exposure to the stock market. 
Falsification and Placebo Tests
While the stock market crash was closely timed with the start of October 2008 (see Figure 1) , it is possible that our post-crash coefficient could be picking up effects of other coincident events or correlated factors, and not the effect of the crash, per se. One such event is the downturn in the housing market; this is particularly important for us to consider since the housing crisis itself may have 17 We also estimated models of non-housing wealth where we allowed the effect of the crash to vary across respondents with no stock/IRA wealth, those with low stock/IRA wealth, and those with high stock/IRA wealth (as in Table 2 , columns 5 and 6), but in which we defined "high" and "low" stock/IRA respondents based on the share of the respondent's wealth held in stocks/IRAs (instead of the level). That is, high stock respondents were those whose share of wealth in stocks/IRAs was above the median share among stock/IRA owners, and low stock respondents are those whose share of wealth was below the median. The share is defined as the amount of wealth in stocks and IRA divided by the total value of wealth including the value of a second home. Because this approach uses two wealth measures, it introduces some measurement error in the post interaction terms and yields a slightly smaller sample because of missing values in total wealth. We did the same exercise for the Appendix 1 models of financial wealth. The results are very similar to what we observe in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 and Appendix 1 (in that the wealth effects of the crash is large, negative and significant only for those with high shares of stock), although the point estimates are smaller, which is consistent with measurement error. Figure   2A plots the index based on all transactions, which includes new home purchases and refinancing appraisals for existing homeowners; these data represent the most comprehensive information respondents might have about the value of their home. Figure 2B Figure 2B suggests that, if anything, national housing prices were starting to recover in the post-crash period relative to the pre-crash period.
As a result, respondents interviewed after the crash may report smaller changes in real estate values than pre-crash respondents. Thus, any confounding of our estimates from the foreclosure crisis and decline in housing wealth should bias us towards finding no effect of the crash.
We follow this by conducting a falsification test using housing wealth as defined by HRS respondents. For this exercise, we estimate the same series of models shown in Equations (1) through (3) where the dependent variable is housing wealth. Table 5 reports the reduced form estimates of the effects to the stock market crash on six different measures of mental health and self-reported health.
Wealth Effects of the Stock Market Crash on Health
We again estimate models using both the full sample and the trimmed sample.
The first two columns report results from models of the CES-D index; recall that
higher values of this index imply more depressive symptoms. The pattern of results is mixed. Respondents who owned no stock/IRA accounts were not affected by the crash, while the wealthier half of stockholders reported more depressive symptoms after the crash. However, the latter effect is not statistically significant, and the less wealthy half of stockholders reported significantly fewer depressive symptoms after the crash than the other groups.
The next four columns of Table 5 report results from models where the dependent variable is an indicator for feeling depressed or taking anti-depressant medications. These results show a pattern that is very consistent with those who are most exposed to the crash experiencing the greatest changes in health. For example, non-stockholders and the less-wealthy half of stockholders, who experienced no significant declines in wealth from the crash, experience no significant changes in the likelihood of feeling depressed or taking antidepressants as a result of the crash. The wealthier half of respondents, who experienced statistically significantly and large wealth declines following the 20 crash, also experience statistically significant increases in the likelihoods of feeling depressed and taking anti-depressants as a result of the crash. For that group, the stock market crash increased the probability of feeling depressed by 8.2
percentage points, or nearly 50% from a base of 16.6 percent ( Table 1 , column 4).
The crash also increased the probability that the wealthier half of respondents take anti-depressants by 6.2 percentage points, or nearly 35% from a base of 17.6 percent ( Table 1 , column 4). Additional analysis also shows a longer lag in antidepressant use than in feelings of depression following the crash.
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In the remainder of Table 5 , we report results from models of self-reported health, and two binary indicators defined from that measure (poor/fair health, and excellent/very good health). For models of self-reported health (columns 7 and 8), we see additional evidence that the effects of the crash on health are consistent with its effects on wealth. We find no evidence of health effects among respondents who did not own stocks or IRAs. Both groups of stockholders report significantly worse health, and the post-crash coefficient is larger for the wealthier half of stockholders than it is for the less wealthy half. Interestingly, the crashinduced reductions in health are coming from a decline in respondent reports of very good or excellent health, and not from an increase in fair or poor health. In the fair/poor health models, it appears that all respondents are uniformly affected by the crash; since wealth effects were clearly concentrated among the wealthier half of stockholders, this result is not consistent with the effects of crash-induced wealth losses. In models of excellent/very good health, the results show that the same respondents with the large wealth losses are most likely to report reductions in self-reports of strong health. This may be explained by the fact that respondents with more wealth (and more stock market exposure) are more likely to report excellent or very good health, and less likely to report fair or poor health.
To directly examine the causal relationship between wealth and health, we estimate a set of first difference instrumental variables models; results are reported in Table 6 To benchmark the size of this effect, we compare our results to those reported in Lindahl (2005) , which estimates the effect of a percent change in income on an index of bad health. For this exercise, we estimate our IV models using the log of wealth as the endogenous regressor. 22 We find that a 10% increase in wealth reduces the likelihood of depression by 3.4% of a standard deviation and increases the likelihood of excellent/very good health by 3.8% of a standard deviation; the estimated effects on anti-depressant use and the continuous measure of self-reported health are smaller, at 2.5% and 2.2% of a standard deviation, respectively. In the full sample of survey respondents, Lindahl finds that a 10% increase in income reduces bad health by 1 to 2 percent of a standard deviation. 23 Our effect sizes may be larger for a number of reasons (e.g., differences in the traits of the survey respondents). Another difference is that variation in wealth in our study is coming from changes over time, in particular, decreases in wealth, on average, while Lindahl uses cross-sectional variation in income. Thus, it is possible that some of the difference is driven by our examination of wealth losses.
We tested the robustness of the health findings to various specification changes. First, we examined how sensitive our results were to alternate definitions of the treatment and control groups, since Figure 1 suggests that the DJIA began to experience some declines in June (although these declines were much smaller than those experienced in the fall 2008). In one specification we used all respondents and defined the treatment group as those interviewed from June 2008 on; we obtained similar results but the size of the crash effects on wealth, depression and self-rated health were smaller, as would be expected. In another specification we excluded respondents interviewed between June and September and defined the treatment group as those interviewed from October 2008 on; we obtained larger point estimates for the effects of the crash on depression and excellent/very good self-reported health, but in the latter case, the standard errors increased (perhaps not surprising since the sample size fell by 37%). In one set of models, we dropped controls for the household income and physical health conditions, given the possible endogeneity of the variables. In another set of models, we dropped all controls including those for changes in cognitive impairment and transitions in marital status, work and retirement. We added a control of the onset of mental health chronic conditions, which we originally excluded out of concerns about endogeneity. In almost all cases, the results from 23 these specification changes are substantively the same as those reported in Tables   5 and 6.   24 Finally, we estimated a set of placebo regressions similar to those shown for wealth; these use the changes in health measures between 2004 and 2006 as the dependent variables, and a set of "fake" post-crash variables as the key explanatory variables. Table 7 Table 4 models. This may be explained by asymmetric effects of wealth on health, which may also help to reconcile our results with those from Smith (2004) , who reported that the gradual stock market wealth accumulations in the 1990s were not associated with improvements in health.
Discussion
In this study we use exogenous variation in wealth brought about the stock market crash that took place in the fall of 2008 to understand the causal effect of wealth loss on health. The crash of 2008 caused immediate and largely unexpected declines in the net worth of U.S. households. Estimates of aggregate portfolio losses were massive, at close to one-third of the value of retirement 24 accounts and a total of $2.8 trillion (Soto, 2008) . Several existing studies examine how the financial crisis of 2008 altered the retirement decisions and expected retirement incomes of older adults (Coile and Levine, 2009 ) and affected the age that older workers expect to retire (McFall, 2011) . Our study examines the immediate wealth and health effects among HRS respondents interviewed postcrash. We contribute to the literature on the health consequences of adverse economic shocks, which includes studies of the recent U.S. foreclosure crisis by Currie and Tekin (2011) and Burgard et al. (2012) and research on Iceland's financial crisis by Ásgeirsdóttir et al. (2012) . Like these other works, our study finds that severe macroeconomic events have significant consequences for health.
Moreover, we exploit the exogenous variation in wealth created by the crash to address a question of long-standing interest in the health economic and social epidemiology literatures: what is the causal effect of wealth on health? Our study adds to a number of careful studies in the area but is somewhat unique in that we examine the immediate effect of sudden wealth losses on psychological well-being. Other studies that examine negative income shocks focus on mortality; and other studies that examine mental health consequences examine the effects of increase income from lottery winnings.
We find new evidence that large wealth losses cause immediate reductions in mental health. Those respondents with the greatest exposure to the stock market suffered the most significant wealth losses and the most significant increases in depression and the likelihood of anti-depressant use. Instrumental variables models of health suggest that the effects of large wealth losses are nontrivial. In our IV models, we estimate that a loss of $50,000 raises the likelihood of feeling depressed by 1.35 percentage points, or 8%. In our reduced form specifications, we estimate that respondents most affected by the crash (who lost nearly $250,000 as a result), had nearly a 50% increase in the likelihood of feeling depressed and a 35% increase in the likelihood of taking anti-depressants. One limitation of our analysis is that the HRS data do not permit us to examine whether the effects we observe are transient or permanent.
These Sample Size 9,999 9,800 9,999 9,800 9,999 9,800
Notes: Samples are restricted to non-proxy interviews, financial respondents, and those born before 1954. Where indicated, the sample excludes households in the top and bottom 1% of the assets distribution in the base year. All models include controls for changes in marital status, work status, retirement status, changes in household income and its square, changes in household size, the onset of new physical health conditions, changes in cognitive function, the number of months between waves and its square, and changes in the season of interview. The first-stage instruments are POST*NOSTOCK, POST*HIGHSTOCK and POST*LOWSTOCK, as defined in the text and the notes to Table 5 . Statistical significance is indicated by *** for 0.01 level, ** for 0.05 level, and * for 0.10 level; p-values from chi-square tests are presented in parentheses. 
